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Government Affiliation, Real Earnings Management, and Firm Performance: 
The Case of Privately Held Firms in China 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a moderated mediation model, we investigate the effects of government affiliation 
on the performance and real earnings management of privately held firms in China 
between 1998 and 2012. We find that politically affiliated firms tend to have superior 
accounting performance. The findings also suggest that politically affiliated firms are 
more likely than non-affiliated firms to engage in real activities to manipulate earnings. 
Furthermore, regional economic development moderates the relationships between 
political affiliation and real earnings management as well as firm performance. Finally, 
real earnings management mediates the effect of political affiliation on firm performance 
among privately held firms. 
Keywords: Government affiliation; privately held firm; performance; real earnings 
management 
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1. Introduction 
           A large body of literature examines the effects of executives’ political connections 
on firm performance (Faccio, 2006; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Li, Meng, Wang, and 
Zhou, 2008; Su and Fung, 2013), but the results are inconclusive. For example, Faccio 
(2006) utilizes event study methodology and shows a significant increase in firm value 
when top executives and large shareholders become politicians. In contrast, Fan et al. 
(2007) find that recently privatized firms with politically connected chairmen or CEOs 
have inferior performance in the three-year post-IPO period. It is not surprising to find 
mixed or even contradictory evidence, as the research settings in these studies differ, and 
such connections have been examined in both mature and emerging economies. It is 
worth noting that most of the extant studies are based on publicly listed companies even 
though privately held firms (i.e., those that are not traded on public stock exchanges) 
serve as an important engine for economic growth and job creation in both developed and 
developing countries (Morck, Stangeland, andYeung, 1998; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 
2005).
1
 While there is an emerging stream of literature exploring the role of political 
connection in private firms (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler, Heil, and Leuz, 
2006; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011), evidence concerning the role political 
connection/affiliation plays in privately held firms remains far from conclusive. More 
recently, the effect of political connections on financial reporting quality has received 
much attention (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Chaney et al., 2011). It is crucial to 
                                                          
1 For example, Forbes reported in 2008 that the 441 largest privately held enterprises in the U.S. generated 
$1.8 trillion in revenue and employed 6.2 million individuals (Reifman and Murphy, 2008). In addition, 
China had more than 50 million small and medium-sized private firms as of end-2011, accounting for 99.8% 
of the total number of enterprises and 60% of the country’s GDP (China Statistics Yearbook 2012). 
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examine how political connections affect accounting quality, as stakeholders rely on 
corporate disclosure to improve their decision-making quality. The present study 
examines the relationships between political affiliation and firm performance and real 
earnings management, and it seeks to uncover the mechanism underlying such 
relationships in the setting of privately held firms in China.
2
 
As indicated by Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2010), a firm’s political influences may 
be rooted in the nature of its ownership structure and in the background of its executives; 
the former refers to government ownership, and the latter refers to the political 
connections arising from executives’ prior or current working experience. Although 
scholars have recently started to investigate how publicly listed companies are affected 
by the political influences stemming from government ownership (e.g. Ding et al., 2014), 
most studies focus on the effects of executives’ political connections (Bunkanwanicha 
and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Su and Fung, 
2013). In an agency theory framework, the focus on political connections may overlook 
the potential overriding significance of influences stemming from ownership structure, 
leading to misleading inferences. Put differently, owners’ political influences may have 
different effects from those caused by agents’ personal connections to government or 
government agencies, especially in privately held firms. 
The objective of this study is to fill the aforementioned gaps in the literature by 
offering new and useful evidence on privately held firms’ political affiliations. More 
specifically, this study seeks to shed light on the effects of private firms’ government (or, 
interchangeably, “political”) affiliations, for which we use affiliation with different levels 
                                                          
2
 We use private firms and privately held firms interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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of government as a proxy, on their financial performance and use of real earnings 
management. Furthermore, we explore whether real earnings management mediates the 
effect of government affiliation on firm performance.
3
 Unbalanced regional economic 
development exists in most economies, and such sub-national differences may moderate 
the relationships between political affiliations and real earnings management and firm 
performance. Such a supposition seems plausible given local governments’ varying roles 
in privately held firms’ ownership structures (Faccio, 2006). Therefore, our study further 
explores whether and how regional differences moderate the role of political influences. 
Privately held firms’ accounting issues are under-studied, partly because detailed 
accounting information is usually unavailable for such firms, especially in an 
international setting. Privately held firms are not obligated to disclose such information, 
and even if they do, the disclosures may be of unsatisfactory quality (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). As Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2011) 
rightfully point out, China serves as a natural test bed for a quasi-experimental 
exploration of regional differences in economic development, due in part to the country’s 
well-documented regional imbalances and also to the ability to control for the influences 
of other factors (e.g. culture, policy, history, etc.). Therefore, we used China as the setting 
to test the hypotheses proposed in this study. Furthermore, we have access to an official 
data set containing detailed financial information on privately held firms in China. We 
are confident in the reliability of the information given the official nature of the data set.  
                                                          
3 Following Roychowdhury (2006), we define real earnings management as managers undertaking actions 
that change the timing or structuring of operations and deviate from normal business practices. Given our 
focus on real earnings management in this paper (see details in section 2.1), we are likely to capture the 
lower bound of total earnings management among politically affiliated private firms.  
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Our findings indicate that politically affiliated firms tend to have superior 
accounting performance, but the relationship between their affiliations with different 
levels of government and firm performance is non-monotonic. We further show that 
politically affiliated firms manipulate earnings to a greater extent than non-affiliated 
firms. Furthermore, regional economic development moderates such relationships. 
Finally, real earnings management does serve as a mediator between the political 
affiliation of privately held firms and their performance.  
This study contributes to the broad literature on accounting, corporate governance, 
and entrepreneurial finance in multiple ways. By providing evidence of the value of 
government affiliation in enhancing firm performance, it advances our understanding of 
how privately held firms, as a vital yet informationally opaque part of the economy, can 
benefit from government affiliation. Second, it adds to the literature by presenting 
evidence of the moderating role that regional development plays in the association 
between political affiliation and firm performance. Third, it contributes to the accounting 
literature by showing that political affiliation is an important determinant of real earnings 
management among privately held firms and by demonstrating that the effect may vary 
due to unbalanced economic development. The current study is among the first to present 
evidence that politically affiliated firms use real earnings management to a more 
significant extent, thus contributing to superior performance. Hence, we identify a new 
channel through which political affiliation influences firm performance. The findings of 
this study have important implications for private enterprise owners, potential capital 
suppliers (including both creditors and equity holders), and policy makers, and it can be 
generalized to other jurisdictions including both developing and developed countries. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. The sample and research design are described in 
Section 3, and empirical results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents conclusions. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Effects of political connection on earnings management 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs when managers 
use discretion in financial reporting to mislead stakeholders about underlying 
performance or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on accounting performance. 
The motivations for engaging in earnings management may arise from 1) capital market 
expectations and 2) contracts written in terms of accounting performance. For privately 
held firms, the latter is clearly the key motivation. The literature shows that firms can use 
both accrual-based and real earnings management to enhance accounting performance 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). Unlike accrual-based 
earnings management, which aims to obscure economic performance by altering 
accounting methods, real earnings management changes the execution of real business 
transactions to meet short-term performance targets (Roychowdhury, 2006). Analyzing a 
large sample of public firms from 30 countries, Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, and Lodh (2015) 
find that politically connected firms are more likely than non-connected firms to 
substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management, as the 
former has higher secrecy and is more difficult for investors and regulators to detect. 
Because our study concentrates on politically affiliated private firms, we narrow our 
attention to real earnings management. 
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Research has also examined whether firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management when they are close to violating debt covenants such as dividend payment 
constraints and new debt issuance restrictions (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1994; 
Holthausen, 1981). Earnings management may also come into play when non-listed firms 
have plans to go public (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). Chinese privately held firms 
may have economic incentives to manage earnings prior to an IPO, as steady profitability 
is a key criterion that is evaluated when new equity is issued in the capital market. As for 
managerial compensation contracting, masking poor performance could increase 
managerial compensation among Chinese state-owned enterprises (Kato and Long, 2006). 
An equally important issue is the potential consequence when earnings 
management is identified. Efficient monitoring can, to some extent, increase the chance 
of earnings manipulation being detected. Thus, managers must weigh the benefits and 
costs of such activities.
4
 Political connections might facilitate earnings management by 
reducing the associated costs. Chaney et al. (2011) show that politically connected firms 
have low accounting quality, and they conjecture that political connections may serve to 
shield firms from penalization for low-quality reported earnings. The potential to receive 
political protection when engaged in earnings management could be even stronger when 
the managers are politicians themselves, as they have political power and prestige.  
2.2. Effects of political connection on firm performance  
                                                          
4 For example, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1996) point out that once earnings management is detected, 
investors are likely to revise down their valuations of a firm and to have less confidence in the credibility of 
the firm’s financial reporting and in the reputation of its management; this leads to higher monitoring costs 
for the firm and a higher cost of raising capital.   
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Political connection enables firms to secure favorable regulatory treatment 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and access to valuable resources, which contribute to 
improved performance (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Empirical evidence suggests that political connection can 
benefit firms in both developing and developed countries. Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang (2009) examine the performance of politically connected firms in 
Thailand. They find that after becoming politically connected, a firm’s market-to-book 
ratio increases from 0.918 to 3.141 on average. They further find that connected firms 
outperform their non-connected counterparts by 160%. Furthermore, they show that 
politically connected firms benefit from government policies, including favorable tax 
rates and new government contracts. Khwaja and Mian (2005) report that politically 
connected firms in Pakistan receive 45% larger loans than their non-connected 
counterparts, although their default rates are 50% higher. Likewise, Charumilind, Kali, 
and Wiwattanakantang (2006) demonstrate that politically connected firms have greater 
access to bank credit. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) show that in the U.S. stock 
market, there is a positive abnormal stock return following the announcement of a board 
nomination of a politically connected individual. Faccio et al. (2006) investigate 450 
politically connected firms in 35 countries and find that publicly traded firms with 
political connections are more likely to obtain a bailout than their non-connected peers, 
ceteris paribus. 
China is characterized by relatively weak investor protection and severe 
government intervention into business activities. For example, North (2005) notes that 
the ruling Chinese Communist Party still dominates every aspect of life in China, and Wei, 
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Xie, and Zhang (2005) remark that “politics trumps economics” in the country. Since the 
late 1970s, China has carried out economic reforms to open up its centrally planned 
economy and foster a market-oriented one, but the government still retains the power to 
allocate key resources. To access these resources, it is critical for firms to maintain good 
relationships with the government. Therefore, how political connections influence the 
performance of Chinese firms is a question with practical implications. Fan et al. (2007) 
find that long-term post-IPO stock returns and accounting performance are significantly 
worse among Chinese listed firms with politically connected CEOs. Furthermore, they 
report that politically connected listed firms have as board members more current or 
former government officials, who have fewer business skills and less experience. This 
suggests that politically connected firms in China suffer rather than benefit from their 
close ties with the government. However, later studies report a positive effect of political 
connection on firm performance in China. For example, Li et al. (2008) find that 
entrepreneurs’ affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party has a positive effect on firm 
performance. Su and Fung (2013), working with a large sample of Chinese listed firms, 
report a positive relationship between management team members’ political connections 
and accounting performance and firm value. Thus, the empirical results so far are mixed 
regarding the effect of political connection on firm performance in China. 
2.3. Political affiliation versus political connection 
Government-affiliated firms usually refer to the subsidiaries of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), which have equivalent administrative rankings to the corresponding 
layers of government, or to firms engaged in a tertiary industry of the government itself. 
This intrinsic relation is determined when the affiliated firms are established. The 
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literature identifies political connections based on whether managers have ever worked in 
the government (Fan et al., 2007), whether the owners are members of the party (Li et al., 
2008), or even whether top executives (CEO, COO, president, etc.) and board members 
have ever taken positions in the government (Su and Fang 2013). However, in an agency 
framework, political affiliation is fundamentally different from political connection, as 
the former concerns the political power of firm owners (principals), while the latter 
concerns that of executives (agents). This is similar to the relationship between land and 
tools in traditional economics: owners have land, while executives have tools (Ding et al., 
2014). Moreover, the potential divergence of the two parties’ interests could generate 
agency costs, especially for politically connected firms that have managerial executives 
with great political power. In that sense, politically affiliated firms may benefit more than 
politically unconnected firms. 
Furthermore, a self-selection issue could arise when examining the effect of 
political connection on firm performance, as CEOs, top executives, or board members 
may only consider serving in firms with good historical performance. However, this 
concern can be avoided in the case of politically affiliated firms, as the intrinsic relation 
is already fixed when an affiliated firm is created. In addition, when measuring a firm’s 
political power in the traditional way, it is possible to determine whether any such 
political relationship exists through its executives and directors but not the level of this 
relationship. In contrast, the level of political power can be quantified by tracing the 
layers of government with which firms are affiliated; this allows us to examine the effect 
of government affiliation on firm performance at various levels of political power.      
2.4. Government affiliation, firm performance, and real earnings management 
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Studies suggest that the benefits of political connections include easy access to 
credit from state-owned banks, favorable tax treatment, relaxed market entry, and a 
higher probability of government bailout in case of financial distress (Claessens, Feijen, 
and Laeven, 2008; Faccio, 2006, 2010; Infante and Piazza, 2014). A recent study by 
Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014) suggests that in the U.S., political connections are 
associated with a lower cost of bank loans. As private firms have limited access to equity 
finance, they are more dependent on debt financing for investment and growth. Political 
connections enable private firms to have access to loans from state-controlled banks at 
lower costs, which enhances their ability to finance investments in projects with positive 
net present value. Additionally, the evidence supports a positive relation between 
political connections and the allocation of government contracts. For example, Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2011) find that U.S. companies connected with the winning party after 
the 1992 and 2000 presidential elections were more likely to experience an increase in the 
value of government procurement contracts. If this holds true for private firms, it suggests 
that those affiliated with the government are more likely to receive government contracts 
that can generate sustainable revenues. Similarly, politically affiliated firms are more 
likely than their non-affiliated counterparts to receive subsidies from the government to 
boost their performance.
5
 Finally, political connection may help firms reduce the costs 
                                                          
5  Government subsidies, which include tax rebates, direct cash payments, land guarantees, and debt 
forgiveness, can be granted by either the central or local government to pursue socio-political objectives 
such as job creation and sustainable economic growth (O’Connor, Deng, and Luo, 2006; Hung, Wong, and 
Zhang, 2008). 
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associated with contract enforcement, helping to strengthen their competitive advantage. 
Consequently, we expect to find support for the following hypothesis:
6
  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between political affiliation and the 
performance of privately held firms. 
 
China is characterized by unequal development across its regions (Brandt and Li, 
2003). For example, the average GDP per capita of the more developed eastern region in 
2006 was 24,910 RMB (3,153 USD), whereas that of the less developed western region 
was 9,859 RMB (1,248 USD).7 It is likely that political affiliation can generate more 
economic benefits in less developed regions, where the government plays a more 
instrumental role in resource allocation. Furthermore, in less developed regions, the 
protection of property rights and legal enforcement are likely to be weaker, suggesting 
that firms with political affiliation may obtain more benefits in terms of reduced costs 
associated with contract enforcement (Hellman, Jones, and kaufmann, 2003). Therefore, 
we expect that imbalanced regional development moderates the association between 
political affiliation and firm performance. Based on this discussion, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
                                                          
6 We use accounting-based measures to capture the performance of private firms. However, it is likely that 
accounting measures are vulnerable to manager manipulation. To mitigate this concern, we include 
measures of real earnings management as a control variable in the regression when testing the effect of 
political affiliation on the performance of private firms. Furthermore, we develop a mediation model to 
disentangle the effect of political affiliation on performance and the effect of political affiliation on real 
earnings management. 
7 Research concludes that fiscal decentralization and the re-orientation of China’s regional development 
policy in favor of the coastal provinces have contributed to the widening gap between coastal and inland 
provinces (Tsui, 1996). 
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Hypothesis 2: The positive association between political affiliation and firm 
performance is less (more) pronounced among private firms located in more (less) 
developed regions. 
      Studies show that the earnings quality of private firms is generally lower than 
that of publicly listed firms, primarily because there is less demand for high-quality 
accounting information from non-listed firms (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et 
al., 2006).  According to a recent study by Braam et al. (2015), politically connected 
firms are more likely to use real earnings management because real activity manipulation 
is not under the scrutiny of auditing rules or regulatory enforcement. Therefore, real 
earnings management enables politically connected firms to preserve the reputations of 
the firm and the connected politician while at the same time achieving the desired 
performance outcomes. We suggest that politically affiliated private firms are likely to 
undertake real earnings management to increase earnings for the following reasons. First, 
if managers of such firms are successful in improving performance through the use of 
real earnings management, they have a higher chance of being promoted (e.g., to a 
managerial position in a larger company or even to positions in the government), 
suggesting that earnings management carries significant benefits. Second, managers of 
firms with political affiliations are less likely to be penalized for engaging in earnings 
manipulation even if they are detected, as punishment would be a face-losing event for 
the firm and the associated government. This indicates a lower cost of engaging in 
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earnings management (Chaney et al., 2011; You and Du, 2012).
8
 In summary, we expect 
to find support for the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Privately held firms with political affiliations tend to engage in 
real earnings management to a more significant extent than non-affiliated firms. 
            We suggest that imbalanced regional development also moderates the association 
between political affiliation and real earnings management. First, investor protection is 
likely to be weaker in less developed regions, where the law and auditing professions are 
also less developed. As a result, politically affiliated firms in less developed regions are 
under fewer constraints to engage in real earnings management. Second, in less 
developed regions, local governments play a dominant role in resource allocation and 
intervene in managing the economy to a more significant extent. The government may 
implicitly encourage affiliated firms to use real earnings management to achieve desired 
growth targets, thus supporting local economic expansion. Therefore, we put forward the 
following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 4: The positive association between political affiliation and real earnings 
management is less (more) pronounced for privately held firms located in more (less) 
developed regions. 
Poor firm performance can negatively influence managers’ compensation and job 
security (Grove, Hond, McMillan, and Naughton, 1995; Kato and Long, 2006) and the 
outcomes of debt contracts. A manager may be motivated to mask the firm’s true 
                                                          
8 You and Du (2012) find that politically connected CEOs are less likely to be fired compared to their non-
connected counterparts.  
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performance through earnings management to avoid such risks. When a firm is 
performing extremely well, a forward-looking manager might engage in real activities to 
create reserves for future potential losses and smooth reported earnings, leading to a 
smaller perceived risk of violating debt covenants. However, this may have little bearing 
on private firms, as the market reaction has little effect on firm value. Instead, creditors 
are more concerned about poor firm performance. The constrained access to outside 
financing influences private firms’ survival and growth. Thus, private firms are largely 
dependent on bank debt financing. To ensure access to bank financing at a lower 
borrowing cost, private firms need to display high profitability. Therefore, private firms 
are motivated to undertake real earnings management to increase their operating 
performance.   
If political affiliation turns out to have a positive effect on firm performance, it is 
likely that politically affiliated firms engage in earnings management to a greater extent, 
leading to inflated accounting-based performance. Thus, we propose the last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Real earnings management mediates the effect of political 
affiliation on the performance of privately held firms. 
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical framework depicted by the above five 
hypotheses. 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Sample  
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Our sample consists of privately held firms operating in Mainland China between 1998 
and 2012 included in the China Non-listed Company Database, which is compiled by 
GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd. with information from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. The database contains detailed financial information on over one 
million non-listed firms from 41 industries across 31 provinces in Mainland China. As 
mentioned earlier, this sample enables us to conduct a natural test of the hypotheses 
proposed in this study (Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang, 2011). Data after 2012 are not used 
because the updated information is not available from GTA. 
GTA inclusively collects information on the Chinese stock market, bond market, 
and other securities market and financial and governance data of both listed and non-
listed firms. The credibility of GTA has been confirmed in previous studies, most of 
which focused on listed firms. Kato and Long (2006) examine the impact of managerial 
turnover on firm performance in China; Wu (2011), using information from the stock 
market database, argues that pure momentum strategies do not work in the Chinese stock 
market. Our study utilizes the Chinese non-listed firm database, a special entity that 
warrants greater attention.  
3.2. Government affiliation 
To construct the main variable of interest, political affiliation, we identify the 
administrative layer of the government or equivalent administrative rank of SOEs with 
which each firm is affiliated. Privately held firms can be affiliated with various levels of 
government: central, provincial, municipal, county, town, and village. Such an affiliation 
is likely to be exogenously determined when a firm is initially incorporated. In addition, 
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some of these politically affiliated firms are subsidiaries of SOEs, which have 
administrative rankings equivalent to the corresponding layer of government. We create a 
dummy variable PA that takes a value of 1 if a private firm is politically affiliated with 
any layer of government and 0 otherwise. 
We further introduce six dummy variables to capture the layer of government 
with which a private firm is affiliated: PANO_C indicates that the firm is affiliated with 
the central government; PANO_P indicates that the firm is affiliated with a provincial 
government; PANO_M indicates that the firm is affiliated with a municipal government; 
PANO_CY indicates that the firm is affiliated with a county government; PANO_T 
indicates that the firm is affiliated with a sub-district, town, or township; and PANO_V 
indicates that the firm is affiliated with a residents’ committee or villagers’ committee, 
the lowest layer in the government. We use these dummy variables to test the potential 
non-linear relationship between different levels of political affiliation and firm 
performance (real earnings management) in section 4.2.3.  
3.3. Moderator 
To describe regional development across the country, China’s National Economic 
Research Institute (NERI) has developed a comprehensive index for each province and 
major municipality. It consists of sub-indexes capturing 1) the government-market 
relationship (i.e., the role of the market in resource allocation); 2) the development of 
non-state-owned sectors (i.e., the percentage of total industrial output that is contributed 
by the private sector); 3) the development of commodity markets; 4) the development of 
factor markets; and 5) market intermediaries (i.e., auditing firms) and the legal 
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environment (i.e., protection of property rights). The reliability of the NERI index has 
been established by research such as Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2011) and Firth et al. 
(2011). 
3.4. Research design for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 
We use return on equity (ROE) in the main analysis and return on assets (ROA) in 
the robustness check to measure the performance of privately held firms, and we use the 
following model to test the relation between political affiliation and performance 
specified in Hypotheses 1 and 2: 
Performance=b0+b1PA+b2NERI+b3PA*NERI+b4Controls+error term                   (1)                                                                                                      
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006; Li et al., 
2008; Su and Fung, 2013), we control the following firm-specific variables when 
investigating the effect of political affiliation on firm performance: natural log of assets 
(size), long-term debt scaled by total assets (leverage), firm age (Age), cash scaled by 
total assets (Slack), property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets (PPE), an 
indicator variable for firms reporting losses (Loss), and standard deviation of investment 
in the last three years (Stdinvest). In addition, we include the year fixed-effect and 
industry fixed-effect. 
3.5. Research design for testing Hypotheses 3-5 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we first construct variables to measure the extent to 
which privately held firms undertake real activities to manage their reported earnings. In 
the literature (i.e., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), there are three main 
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tools to examine the magnitude of earnings management through real activities: abnormal 
operating cash flow, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expense. 
Due to data availability, we use only abnormal production costs as the proxy for real 
earnings management in this study. 
First, we compute the normal level of production costs using a linear model 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) in which normal production costs are 
a function of sales, change in current sales, and change in lagged sales. To estimate the 
model, we run the following regression for each year and industry: 
 
PRODij,t / Aij,t-1 = a1 jt
1
Aij,t-1
+a2 jt
SALESij,t
Aij,t-1
+a3 jt
DSALESij,t
Aij,t-1
+a4 jt
DSALESij,t-1
Aij,t-1
+eij,t
     (2),
 
where PRODijt represents the total production costs for company i in industry j for year t, 
defined as the sum of cost of goods and change in inventories; SALESijt represents the 
sales from company i in industry j for year t; ∆SALESijt represents the change in revenues 
from the prior year for company i in industry j; and ∆SALESijt-1 represents the change in 
revenues for the past two years. The residual (error term) for company i in industry j for 
year t is the abnormal level of production costs. We use the absolute value of abnormal 
production costs to emphasize the magnitude of the manipulation rather than its direction. 
Larger absolute values of abnormal production costs indicate more real earnings 
management. With higher production levels, fixed overhead costs are spread over a larger 
number of units, reducing fixed costs per unit. As long as the reduction in fixed costs per 
unit is not offset by an increase in the marginal cost per unit, total cost per unit declines. 
This indicates that the reported cost of goods sold (CoGS) is lower, and the firm has 
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better operating margins and higher earnings. Then, we use the following model to test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4: 
    RealEM=c0+c1PA+c2NERI+c3PA*NERI+c4Controls+error term                              (3) 
We use abnormal production cost as the measure for privately held firms’ real 
earnings management. Consistent with prior research (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang, 2011; 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Wang, 2005) specifying several firm-specific factors 
that may affect the magnitude of earnings management, we include size, leverage, 
standard deviation of investment in the last three years (Stdinvest), PPE, age, and an 
indicator variable taking a value of 1 for firms reporting losses (Loss) as control variables. 
Similarly, we include the year fixed-effect and industry fixed-effect. 
A mediation effect can be statistically confirmed when (1) the independent 
variable significantly affects the mediator, (2) the independent variable significantly 
affects the dependent variable in the absence of the mediator, (3) the mediator has a 
significant effect on the dependent variable, and (4) the effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable shrinks upon the addition of the mediator to the model (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986; Mackinnon and Dwyer, 1993). In our setting, the dependent variable is 
firm performance (the observed ROE), the mediator is real earnings management 
reflected by abnormal production cost, and the independent variable is political affiliation. 
Accordingly, we need to run four sets of regression: a) earnings management on political 
affiliation (PA) and other control variables; b) firm performance (ROE) on earnings 
management and other control variables without PA; c) firm performance on PA and 
other control variables without earnings management; and d) firm performance on PA 
22 
 
and other control variables with earnings management as the explanatory variable. The 
results enable us to identify whether real earnings management mediates the effect of 
political affiliation on firm performance. Statistically, we use the Sobel mediation test to 
confirm the mediation effect. The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
Note that standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity.  
[Insert Appendix 1 about here] 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of all variables after 
winsorizing at the 1 and 99 percentiles to mitigate the undesired influence of outliers. 
ROE (ROA) has a mean of 0.159 (0.051). The mean of real EM is 0.182. PA has a mean 
of 0.960, suggesting that the majority of our sample firms are politically affiliated. The 
mean of NERI, an index developed to capture regional development across China, is 
6.192, while the 25 and 75 percentiles are 4.45 and 7.63, respectively, indicating it is left-
skewed. The mean of size is 10.067. Leverage locates between 0.000 (25 percentile) and 
0.114 (75 percentile) with a mean of 0.090. Age (PPE) has a mean of 17.30 (0.386). 
Finally, 30.8% of our sample firms report losses. All of the variables show substantial 
variation. 
Table 1, Panel B shows the number and percentage of firms affiliated with 
different levels of government. The largest subgroup consists of firms affiliated with 
county government, with 130,351 firm-year observations, representing 28.53% of the 
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entire sample. There are 114,882 (25.15%) and 82,524 (18.06%) observations for firms 
affiliated with town and municipal governments, respectively, and 49,967 (10.94%) and 
44,226 (9.68%) observations for firms affiliated with village and provincial governments, 
respectively. There are 16,670 firm-year observations (3.65%) for firms affiliated with 
the central government. Lastly, firms with no political affiliation contribute 18,229 firm-
year observations, representing 3.99% of the sample. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the correlations between variables. Both ROE and ROA are 
positively correlated with PA, which provides initial evidence that political affiliation is 
positively associated with firm performance. However, this result should be interpreted 
with caution, as we do not control for other variables that might affect performance. 
However, ROE (ROA) is positively correlated with PANO_V and PANO_T but 
negatively correlated with affiliation with other levels of government. This suggests that 
the relation between political affiliation and performance is non-monotonic. ROE and 
ROA are positively correlated with NERI, suggesting that private firms operating in more 
developed regions are likely to achieve better performance. ROE and ROA are negatively 
related to size, leverage, age, PPE, loss, and stdinvest. In the subsequent sections, we use 
regression analysis to test the effect of political affiliation on firm performance and real 
earnings management after controlling for other factors that have been identified by 
previous studies to affect performance and earnings management. Finally, the correlation 
does not raise concerns about multi-collinearity. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2. Empirical results 
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4.2.1. Results of tests related to Hypotheses 1-4 
Table 3 reports the results related to the effect of political affiliation on firm 
performance as reflected by ROE. Results in Panel A correspond to H1 and H2. In Panel 
A, the coefficient of PA is significantly positive (0.043, t = 2.89), while the coefficient of 
interaction between PA and NERI is significantly negative (-0.007, t = -3.08). This 
implies that private firms with political affiliations have better performance as reflected 
by ROE, but this relation is less pronounced in more developed regions (i.e., those 
scoring higher on the NERI index). The coefficient of NERI is positive and marginally 
significant (0.004, t = 1.76).
9
 Regarding the control variables, the coefficients of size, age, 
PPE, loss, and stdinvest are significant and negative, whereas that of leverage is 
significantly positive. Overall, we find partial support for H1 (that political affiliation has 
a positive effect on the performance of privately held firms) and for H2 (that this relation 
is less evident in more developed regions). It is likely that the government plays a less 
important role in resource allocation in more developed regions because the commodities 
and factor markets function well in these regions. Consequently, the government 
intervenes in business activities in these regions to a lesser extent and thus has less 
influence on the performance of affiliated firms. Hence, our results support H2 (that the 
                                                          
9 We also run the regression after excluding the interaction between PA and NERI to test the main effect of 
political affiliation on firm performance. The coefficient of PA is positive but insignificant in the full 
sample, which is inconsistent with H1. Then, we run the regression for two subsamples: a low level of PA 
subsample, which includes firms with no affiliation and firms affiliated with the village, town, and city 
levels of government, and a high level of PA subsample, which includes firms with no affiliation and firms 
affiliated with municipal, provincial, and central governments. The coefficient of PA is significantly 
positive in the low level of PA subsample but significantly negative in the high level of PA subsample. The 
empirical evidence partially supports H1 (among firms affiliated with village, town, and city levels of 
government) and suggests that different levels of political affiliation could have differential effects on firm 
performance. This motivates us to conduct additional analysis in 4.2.3 to further explore the effect of 
affiliation with different levels of government on firm performance and earnings management. We thank 
the reviewer for raising this issue. The results are available upon request. 
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level of regional development moderates the effect of political affiliation on firm 
performance).  
Table 3, Panel B presents results related to the effect of political affiliation on real 
earnings management among privately held firms (H3 and H4). The coefficient of PA is 
significantly positive (0.022, t = 3.24), whereas the coefficient of interaction between PA 
and NERI is significantly negative (-0.006, t = -5.08), which suggests that private firms 
with political affiliation engage in real earnings management to a greater extent, but this 
relation is less evident among firms in more developed regions, possibly due to better 
investor protection and law enforcement in these regions. The coefficient of NERI is 
positive but insignificant.
10
 Regarding the control variables, the coefficients of size, 
leverage, age, PPE, loss and stdinvest are significantly negative. Overall, we find partial 
support for the hypotheses that political affiliation has a positive effect on engagement in 
real earnings management among private firms and that the effect is moderated by 
regional development.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2.2. Results of tests related to H5 
                                                          
10 We also run the regression after excluding the interaction between PA and NERI to test the main effect 
of political affiliation on earnings management. The coefficient of PA is negative and significant in the full 
sample, which does not support H2. Then, we run the regression for two subsamples: a low level of PA 
subsample, which includes firms with no affiliation and firms affiliated with the village, town, and city 
levels of government, and a high level of PA subsample, which includes firms with no affiliation and firms 
affiliated with municipal, provincial, and central governments. The coefficient of PA is significantly 
positive in the low level of PA subsample but significantly negative in the high level of PA subsample. The 
empirical evidence partially supports H2 (among firms affiliated with village, town, and city levels of 
government) and suggests that different levels of political affiliation could have distinct effects on earnings 
management. This motivates us to conduct additional analysis in 4.2.3 to further explore the effect of 
affiliation with different levels of government on firm performance as well as earnings management. We 
thank the reviewer for this suggestion. The results are available upon request. 
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Table 3, Panel A provides the result of regressing firm performance on the 
measure of political affiliation and other firm-level controls; this can be compared with 
the results in Table 3, Panel C to identify the mediating effect of real earnings 
management. The coefficient of EM is positive and highly significant in Panel C (0.453, t 
= 58.66). The coefficients of PA are positive and significant in both Panel A and Panel C, 
but the magnitude and level of significance of the coefficient of PA in Panel C are lower 
than those in Panel A. This indicates that real earnings management mediates the effect 
of political affiliation on firm performance as reflected by ROE. Plausibly, political 
affiliation allows affiliated firms easier access to credit, government contracts, and 
government subsidies (direct effect) while at the same time making it easier for firms to 
boost performance using real earnings management (indirect effect). The Sobel mediation 
test confirms the mediation effect (z-statistics = 3.23, p < 0.01).
11
 Overall, our results 
partially support H5 (that real earnings management mediates the effect of political 
affiliation on firm performance among private firms). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2.3. Additional analysis 
                                                          
11 We also run the regression after excluding the interaction between PA and NERI to test whether earnings 
management mediates the effect of political affiliation on firm performance. The results do not support the 
mediating effect in the full sample. Then, we run the regression for two subsamples: a low level of PA 
subsample, which includes firms with no affiliation and firms affiliated with the village, town, and city 
levels of government, and a high level of PA subsample, which includes firms with no affiliation and firms 
affiliated with municipal, provincial, and central governments. The results in both subsamples lend support 
to the existence of a mediating effect, as the magnitude of PA declines upon the inclusion of earnings 
management when performance is the dependent variable. The Sobel test confirms that earnings 
management mediates the effect of political affiliation on firm performance. We thank the reviewer for this 
suggestion. The results are available upon request. 
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Our findings suggest that political affiliation has a positive effect on the 
performance of private firms but that this relation could be non-monotonic. There may be 
less provision of economic rents to private firms affiliated with higher-level governments 
(i.e., the central government) than to those affiliated with lower-level governments (i.e., 
residents’/villagers’ committees), as lower-level governments are able to tailor economic 
policy to directly benefit government-affiliated firms. For example, village enterprises 
(VEs) are economic units either collectively owned by local residents of rural areas or 
mainly owned and controlled by farmers (Yueh, 2011). The collectively owned VEs are 
the property of local residents or peasants, but rights of ownership on their behalf are 
exercised by the villagers’/residents’ committees, the lowest level of government in the 
political hierarchy. Because the profits of VEs are shared with low-level governments, 
such governments have an incentive to boost the performance of affiliated firms for their 
own benefit. In addition, town and village governments may have greater discretion in 
resource/subsidy allocation, suggesting that firms affiliated with low-level governments 
are more likely to benefit.
12
 In contrast, higher-level governments assume more 
responsibility for managing the regional or national economy at the macro level and 
therefore have less flexibility to favor certain affiliated firms. In the following, we 
perform tests to shed further light on this important issue. 
We create six dummies to capture the layer of government with which a private 
firm is affiliated. For example, PANO_C equals 1 if the firm is affiliated with the central 
government and 0 if the firm is non-affiliated. Then, we use the non-affiliated firms as 
                                                          
12 Infante and Piazza (2014) find evidence that politically connected firms benefit from lower interest rates 
offered by banks when the connection is at the local level (town council), and this effect is more 
pronounced when connected firms borrow from banks with politicians on their boards. 
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the benchmark and test whether affiliation with the central government has a significant 
effect on firm performance by pooling firms affiliated with the central government and 
non-affiliated firms together. Similarly, we introduce five dummies to capture other 
levels of government with which a private firm is affiliated and test the effect of 
affiliation on performance. The advantage of this approach is that by comparing the 
magnitude of coefficients of different affiliation dummies, we are able to detect potential 
differentiation in relations between political affiliation and firm performance. We use the 
same approach to investigate the relation between political affiliation and real earnings 
management. We also interact NERI with various affiliation dummies. We include the 
control variables in the analysis but do not tabulate results related to controls to save 
space. The results are provided in Table 4, Panels A and B. 
The results in Panel A show that only affiliation with residents’ committees and 
villagers’ committees (PANO_V) and affiliation with sub-districts/townships (PANO_T) 
are positively associated with performance as reflected by ROE, while affiliations with 
county (PANO_CY) and municipal (PANO_M) governments are negatively associated 
with performance. Finally, the coefficients of affiliation with the provincial (PANO_P) 
and central (PANO_C) governments are insignificant. Our results support a non-
monotonic relation between political affiliation and firm performance: affiliation with the 
central and provincial governments has no impact on performance, whereas affiliation 
with county and municipal governments has a negative effect on performance. Only 
affiliation with sub-districts/townships and residents’/villagers’ committees has a positive 
impact on performance. This is consistent with our conjecture that lower-level 
governments (i.e., townships and villages) may have more incentive and discretion to 
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allocate resources and tailor policy to directly benefit affiliated firms. The central 
government, in contrast, is unlikely to pay special attention to an individual firm and is 
equally unlikely to direct resources to specific affiliated firms. Our results suggest that 
the moderating effect of regional development holds only for firms affiliated with sub-
districts/townships and residents’/villagers’ committees, as the coefficients of interaction 
between NERI and the relevant affiliation dummies are significantly negative. The 
coefficients of NERI interacting with other affiliation dummies are insignificant. 
The results in Panel B depict a similar picture: affiliation with residents’ 
committees and villagers’ committees (PANO_V) and affiliation with sub-
districts/townships (PANO_T) are positively associated with real earnings management, 
whereas affiliation with other levels of government has either a negative or an 
insignificant effect on real earnings management. Furthermore, the results in Panel B 
imply that the moderating effect of regional development holds only for firms affiliated 
with sub-districts/townships and residents’/villagers’ committees, as evidenced by the 
negative coefficients of interaction between NERI and the relevant affiliation dummies. 
Finally, the results in Panel C indicate that the mediating effect of real earnings 
management holds only for firms affiliated with sub-districts/townships and 
residents’/villagers’ committees, as confirmed by the Sobel mediation test (z-statistics = 
10.97, p < 0.001; z-statistics = 8.33, p < 0.001, respectively). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2.4. Robustness check 
As a robustness check, we use ROA to replace ROE as the measure of firm 
performance and repeat the analyses. The results, which are presented in Table 5, are 
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broadly consistent with those reported in Table 3. This implies that our findings are 
insensitive to alternative performance measures. We also use ROA to perform a test to 
unravel the non-linear relation between political affiliation and firm performance (real 
earnings management). Our inferences remain qualitatively unchanged. For brevity, we 
do not tabulate these results. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5. Conclusions and future research directions 
Much attention has been paid to the association between politically connected agents and 
firm performance, but little work has been done to examine the nexus of politically 
connected principals and firm performance. In addition, empirical evidence is lacking 
with regard to how different levels of political connection or affiliation may affect 
performance differently. In addition, previous studies underexplore the link between real 
earnings management and firm performance among politically connected firms, thus 
concealing the potential mechanism through which political connection can affect 
performance.   
This study helps fill these gaps in the literature by investigating the effect of 
government affiliation on firm performance and real earnings management with a large 
sample of privately held firms in China between 1998 and 2012. We find that political 
affiliation has a positive effect on firm performance. Furthermore, this relation is 
moderated by regional development. Second, we show that politically affiliated firms are 
more likely to undertake real earnings management. The positive effect of political 
affiliation on real earnings management is less pronounced in firms located in more 
developed regions. Finally, we present evidence that real earnings management mediates 
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the effect of political affiliation on firm performance. We extend the literature by 
addressing the role of politically connected owners, distinguishing the effects of 
principals (owners) with political power from those of politically connected agents 
(executives). This study also advances our understanding of how privately held firms, as 
a significant yet informationally opaque part of the economy, can benefit from affiliation 
with the government and how regional development can moderate the effect. Adding to 
the stream of literature on political connection and accounting quality, we present 
evidence that political affiliation plays a significant role in influencing real earnings 
management, which in turn mediates the effect of government affiliation on firm 
performance. 
Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, our results could be driven 
by a correlated omitted variable (an unobservable or uncontrolled variable that is 
correlated with political affiliation and firm performance).
13
 Due to the difficulty in 
identifying an exogenous shock to firms’ political affiliation status, we are unable to rule 
out this possibility. Second, this study only considers real earnings management and 
ignores accrual-based earnings management. Therefore, our results might underestimate 
the effect of political affiliation on earnings management in private firms. 
This paper opens broad avenues for future research in three directions. First, the 
study could easily be extended to an international setting when data are available. Our 
understanding of the implications of political affiliation would be advanced by examining 
the issue in other countries with various cultures and levels of economic development. 
Second, as we only consider real earnings management in this study, we are likely to 
                                                          
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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capture the lower bound of total earnings management among Chinese private firms. 
Future research may include other types of earnings management to enrich our 
knowledge. Finally, we control for the influence of firm-level characteristics but do not 
consider the characteristics of top management due to a lack of relevant data. As 
politically affiliated owners can mitigate agency-cost concerns and exert diverse 
influences on firm performance, the characteristics of top executives are clearly important 
determinants of competitive advantage. The quality of accounting information is also 
associated with managerial ability in earnings management. Thus, future work could take 
into account information about firms’ top management teams in the analysis.  
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Table 1  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. P 25 Median P 75 
ROE 456849 0.159 0.635 -0.004 0.048 0.206 
ROA 456849 0.051 0.159 -0.008 0.012 0.067 
EM 456849 0.182 0.263 0.042 0.097 0.207 
PA 456849 0.960 0.196 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PANO_V 68196 0.733 0.443 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PANO_T 133111 0.863 0.344 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PANO_CY 148580 0.877 0.328 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PANO_M 100753 0.819 0.385 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PANO_P 62455 0.708 0.455 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PANO_C 34899 0.478 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NERI 456849 6.192 1.951 4.450 5.890 7.630 
Size 456849 10.067 1.592 9.003 9.934 11.048 
Lev 456849 0.090 0.160 0.000 0.001 0.114 
Age 456849 17.302 14.204 7.000 12.000 25.000 
PPE 456849 0.386 0.229 0.204 0.358 0.545 
Loss 456849 0.308 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Stdinvst 456849 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.002 
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Table 1  
Panel B: Different types of political affiliation 
 Observations Percentage Cumulative percentage 
No Affiliation 18,229 3.99% 3.99% 
Village 49,967 10.94% 14.93% 
Town 114,882 25.15% 40.07% 
County 130,351 28.53% 68.61% 
Municipal 82,524 18.06% 86.67% 
Province 44,226 9.68% 96.35% 
Centre 16,670 3.65% 100.00% 
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Table 2  
Correlation table 
 ROE ROA EM PA PANO_V PANO_T PANO_CY PANO_M 
ROE 1 
       ROA 0.531*** 1 
      EM 0.229*** 0.386*** 1 
     PA 0.004** 0.010*** -0.009*** 1 
    PANO_V 0.101*** 0.171*** 0.082*** 1.000*** 1 
   PANO_T 0.062*** 0.104*** 0.043*** 1.000*** . 1 
  PANO_CY -0.025*** -0.046*** -0.045*** 1.000*** . . 1 
 PANO_M -0.051*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 1.000*** . . . 1 
PANO_P -0.051*** -0.125*** -0.133*** 1.000*** . . . . 
PANO_C -0.062*** -0.096*** -0.121*** 1.000*** . . . . 
NERI 0.026*** 0.073*** 0.032*** 0.067*** 0.179*** 0.143*** 0.057*** 0.126*** 
Size -0.080*** -0.107*** -0.192*** 0.070*** 0.008** 0.038*** 0.076*** 0.263*** 
Lev -0.010*** -0.102*** -0.094*** -0.007*** -0.170*** -0.081*** 0.040*** 0.009*** 
Age -0.083*** -0.174*** -0.140*** 0.003** -0.290*** -0.177*** 0.054*** 0.085*** 
PPE -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.089*** -0.008*** -0.112*** -0.060*** 0.064*** -0.040*** 
Loss -0.227*** -0.439*** -0.131*** -0.017*** -0.217*** -0.160*** 0.004 0.071*** 
Stdinvst -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.027*** 0.003* -0.038*** -0.009*** -0.007** 0.031*** 
 PANO_P PANO_C NERI Size Lev Age PPE Loss 
PANO_P 1 
       PANO_C . 1 
      NERI 0.263*** 0.183*** 1 
     Size 0.338*** 0.463*** 0.101*** 1 
    Lev 0.024*** 0.019*** -0.136*** 0.138*** 1 
   Age 0.161*** 0.241*** -0.120*** 0.120*** 0.157*** 1 
  PPE -0.056*** 0.004 -0.149*** 0.050*** 0.265*** 0.106*** 1 
 Loss 0.093*** 0.042*** -0.086*** 0.024*** 0.128*** 0.203*** 0.097*** 1 
Stdinvst 0.053*** 0.079*** 0.016*** 0.143*** 0.023*** 0.046*** -0.080*** 0.013*** 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 3  
Main results from testing Hypotheses 1-5 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
ROE 
ROE 
EM ROE 
PA 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.033** 
 2.89 3.24 2.23 
PA*NERI -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.005** 
 -3.08 -5.08 -2.01 
EM     
 
  0.453*** 
     
 
  58.66 
NERI 0.004* 0.002 0.004 
 1.76 1.39 1.47 
Size -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.019*** 
 -41.41 -84.51 -26.35 
Lev 0.169*** -0.037*** 0.186*** 
 19.27 -14.41 21.5 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -15.93 -47.76 -7.80 
PPE -0.011* -0.058*** 0.015*** 
 -1.91 -23.28 2.79 
Loss -0.294*** -0.050*** -0.271*** 
 -116.8 -60.04 -110.03 
Stdinvst -0.127*** -0.045*** -0.106*** 
 -3.55 -2.89 -3.08 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
N 456849 456849 456849 
Adj.R
2 0.071 
 
0.095 0.102 
F
 
342.4 486.4 366.5 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 4  
Results from additional analysis Panel A 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
PANO_V 0.078*** 0.251***           
 7.93 11.39           
PANO_V*NERI  -0.029***           
  -9.29           
PANO_T   0.037*** 0.154***         
   5.13 8.94         
PANO_T*NERI    -0.020***         
    -7.65         
PANO_CY     -0.061*** -0.071***       
     -9.60 -4.45       
PANO_CY*NER
I 
     0.002       
      0.68       
PANO_M       -0.049*** -0.036**     
       -6.73 -2.09     
PANO_M*NERI        -0.002     
        -0.90     
PANO_P         -0.043*** -0.01   
         -4.83 -0.50   
PANO_P*NERI          -0.005*   
          -1.80   
PANO_C           -0.016 0.004 
           -1.21 0.15 
PANO_C*NERI            -0.003 
            -0.90 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 68196 68196 133111 133111 148580 148580 100753 100753 62455 62455 34899 34899 
Adj.R2 0.115 0.116 0.089 0.090 0.054 0.054 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.039 0.056 0.056 
F 266.59 81.14 133.13 128.6 108.38 104.43 94.83 91.58 83.87 35.33 93.62 43.95 
 
Z test Z(PANO_V ≠ PANO_T)=3.37**      Z(PANO_T ≠ PANO_CY)=10.20***      Z(PANO_CY ≠ PANO_M)=-1.22     Z(PANO_M ≠ PANO_P)=-0.51     Z(PANO_P ≠ PANO_C)=-1.67* 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 4  
Results from additional analysis Panel B 
 EM EM EM EM EM EM EM EM EM EM EM EM 
PANO_V 0.025*** 0.090*** 
           5.23 8.67 
          PANO_V*NERI 
 
-0.011***  
           
 
-7.19 
          PANO_T 
  
0.002 0.090***  
         
  
0.74 11.41 
        PANO_T*NERI 
   
-0.015***  
         
   
-12.19 
        PANO_CY 
    
-0.035*** -0.032*** 
       
    
-13.25 -4.50 
      PANO_CY*NER
I      
-0.001 
       
     
-0.48 
      PANO_M 
      
-0.043***  -0.036***  
     
      
-15.56 -4.98 
    PANO_M*NERI 
       
-0.001 
     
       
-1.05 
    PANO_P 
        
-0.038*** -0.015* 
   
        
-11.32 -1.86 
  PANO_P*NERI 
         
-0.004***  
   
         
-2.85 
  PANO_C 
          
-0.025***  -0.002 
 
          
-4.41 -0.14 
PANO_C*NERI 
           
-0.004**  
 
           
-2.53 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 68196 68196 133111 133111 148580 148580 100753 100753 62455 62455 34899 34899 
Adj.R2 0.079 0.080 0.073 0.077 0.104 0.104 0.097 0.097 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.107 
F 130.42 70.48 120.53 122.63 190.09 183.34 540.31 521.24 198.51 79.05 82.51 220.00 
 
Z test Z(PANO_V ≠ PANO_T)=3.85***     Z(PANO_T ≠ PANO_CY)=8.86***     Z(PANO_CY ≠ PANO_M)=2.07**     Z(PANO_M ≠ PANO_P)=-1.23      Z(PANO_P ≠ PANO_C)=-1.95* 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 4  
Results from additional analysis Panel C 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
PANO_V 0.066***  0.206*** 
           6.88 9.63 
          PANO_V*NERI 
 
-0.024***  
           
 
-7.72 
          PANO_T 
  
0.036***   0.112***  
         
  
5.04 6.61 
        PANO_T*NERI 
   
-0.013*** 
         
   
-5.06 
        PANO_CY 
    
-0.048***  -0.059*** 
       
    
-7.59 -3.73 
      PANO_CY*NER
I      
0.002 
       
     
0.76 
      PANO_M 
      
-0.037***  -0.025 
     
      
-5.00 -1.48 
    PANO_M*NERI 
       
-0.002 
     
       
-0.76 
    PANO_P 
        
-0.033*** -0.006 
   
        
-3.62 -0.28 
  PANO_P*NERI 
         
-0.004 
   
         
-1.46 
  PANO_C 
          
-0.009 0.005 
 
          
-0.65 0.17 
PANO_C*NERI 
           
-0.002 
 
           
-0.60 
NERI 
 
0.012*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
-0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
 
4.55 
 
3.01 
 
-0.03 
 
0.41 
 
0.26 
 
0.56 
EM 
 
0.502*** 0.499*** 0.468*** 0.466*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.294*** 0.294*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 
 30.14 29.97 40.10 39.79 25.72 25.72 19.14 19.14 14.41 14.39 12.62 12.62 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 68196 68196 133111 133111 148580 148580 100753 100753 62455 62455 34899 34899 
Adj.R
2
 0.162 0.163 0.131 0.131 0.073 0.073 0.053 0.053 0.048 0.048 0.068 0.068 
F 278.49 88.64 145.57 140.77 111.16 107.20 97.96 94.64 119.69 36.85 69.20 45.19 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 5  
Results from robustness tests 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
ROA EM ROA 
PA 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 
 
5.55 3.24 4.43 
PA*NERI -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.002*** 
 
-5.39 -5.08 -3.51 
EM 
   
 
0.453*** 
 
   
 
58.66 
NERI 0.004*** 0.002 0.003*** 
 
6.86 1.39 6.58 
Size -0.010*** -0.031*** -0.004*** 
 
-42.80 -84.51 -20.60 
Lev -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.019*** 
 
-16.12 -14.41 -12.67 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
-44.50 -47.76 -31.49 
PPE 0.029*** -0.058*** 0.040*** 
 
18.92 -23.28 27.83 
Loss -0.140*** -0.050*** -0.130*** 
 
-284.39 -60.04 -290.43 
Stdinvst 0.034*** -0.045*** 0.043*** 
 
3.50 -2.89 4.75 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
N 456849 456849 456849 
Adj.R
2
 0.238 0.095 0.326 
F 1802.5 486.4 1886.6 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Figure 1 Model: Government Affiliation, Real Earnings Management, and Firm Performance 
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Appendix 1 Variable Definition  
Variable Definition 
ROE Return on equity (net income/ total equity) 
ROA Return on assets (net income/ total assets) 
EM Real earnings management proxied by the absolute value of abnormal production costs 
PA An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with political affiliation, and 0 otherwise. 
PANO_V An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms politically affiliated with residents’/villagers’ 
committee level government, and 0 for firms with no political affiliation. 
PANO_T An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms politically affiliated with sub-district/township 
level government, and 0 for firms with no political affiliation. 
PANO_CY An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms politically affiliated with county level 
government, and 0 for firms with no political affiliation. 
PANO_M An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms politically affiliated with municipality level 
government, and 0 for firms with no political affiliation. 
PANO_P An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms politically affiliated with provincial 
government, and 0 for firms with no political affiliation. 
PANO_C An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms politically affiliated with central government, 
and 0 for firms with no political affiliation. 
NERI Chinese Regional economic development index for each province. Higher value indicates higher level 
of development. 
Size Size of the firm (natural log of total assets). 
Lev Leverage (long-term debt scaled by total assets). 
Age Firm age measured by the number of years a firm has been in business. 
PPE Property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. 
Loss An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative net income, and 0 otherwise. 
Stdinvst Standard deviation of firm investment in the last three years 
 
